

Box 37
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NSC F91-8

1/4/91

TAB F-

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DEC 1 - 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: General Norstad's Letter of November 16

General Norstad's letter of November 16 to you encloses proposed instructions to NATO planners which are only in part consistent with U.S. policy on military actions in a Berlin conflict. In the main, these proposed instructions tend to reflect the view that events at the time will make it highly improbable that the Allies will have the opportunity to execute the preferred sequence of actions designated in the annex to your letter of October 20. It would, therefore, not seem desirable to permit the proposed instructions to be used in their present form.

The attached proposed letter from you to General Norstad would again succinctly set forth the dominant themes in the U.S. preferred course of military action and ask General Norstad to plan to accommodate this course of action. The General may continue to have reservations on U.S. policy. However, the proposed reply would nevertheless require him in any event to take the minimum necessary planning steps to make the U.S. preferred course of military action feasible from a military point of view, Soviet reactions permitting.

1/21/62 Dean Rusk

Secretary of State

SIGNED

ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

Proposed letter to General Norstad.

SEC DEF CORR NO. TS-4361

MAC (DEFENSE) 87-10 57

87-103-118

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Dear General Horstad:

I have carefully studied your letter of November 16, as have my advisers. Although in general it takes into account my letter of October 20 with its enclosure, there are certain significant respects in which it diverges. In the following paragraphs, I therefore expand somewhat on my previous guidance concerning the nature and purpose of the several phases of the U.S. preferred sequence of actions.

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In any case, the planning guidance you issue should serve both to stimulate the build-up of required forces and lead to the development of agreed Allied plans for the use of these forces in accordance with the sequence of military action set out in my letter of October 20.

